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This chapter reviews the effects of performance management sys-
tems in federally sponsored employment and training programs. We
focus on programs for the disadvantaged because they have the longest
history, but the lessons generalize to other programs. We find in our
survey that most of the evidence on the effects of performance systems
relates to their failure to motivate behavior in the direction of increas-
ing the mean impact of program participation, and their success at
inducing cream skimming and strategic responses on the part of pro-
gram operators. At the same time, little or nothing is known about the
effects of performance systems on assignment to service types or on
the technical efficiency of program operation. We recommend further
research to fill in gaps in our knowledge as well as policy changes to
reflect the knowledge we already have.
The remainder of the chapter proceeds as follows. The next section
lays out the theory behind performance management systems in gov-
ernment programs. The third section provides the historical background
on the use of performance management in U.S. employment and train-
ing programs, followed in the fourth section by a discussion of the
available evidence on incentive effects in employment and training pro-
grams. The final section provides conclusions and recommendations.
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
Here we explore why an incentive-based system might be useful in
employment and training programs, and why existing performance
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management systems take the form they do. We draw primarily upon
research on the Job Training Partnership Act (JTPA). The JTPA pro-
gram was the primary federal training program for the disadvantaged
from 1982 through 1998, at which time the Workforce Investment Act
(WIA) program replaced it.1 
The Purpose of Performance Management Systems
Consider the JTPA program (the same issues arise in WIA). This
program involved the federal, state, and local levels of government.
The federal government funded the program and set its broad outlines.
Administration was partly devolved to the state level, and operation
was primarily the responsibility of local entities. The key problem with
such an arrangement is that the state and local governments, and their
contractors, may have goals different from those of the federal govern-
ment. In the language of economics, such multilevel programs involve
a principal–agent problem in which the federal government (the princi-
pal) tries to get its agents (state and local governments and their con-
tractors in JTPA and WIA) to further its program goals.2 See
Prendergast (1999) and Dixit (2002) for theoretical discussions of prin-
cipal–agent problems.
A first step in solving principal–agent problems is for the principal
to define its goals. As Dixit (2002) points out, ascertaining the goals of
federal programs is not always a simple matter, and even when they are
clear, there are often multiple, partially conflicting goals representing
the aims of different stakeholders. In the case of JTPA, Section 141 of
the statute states that opportunities for training are to be provided to
“those who can benefit from, and are most in need of, such opportuni-
ties.” Furthermore, the statute states in Section 106, which describes
the program’s performance management system, that training should
be considered an investment and that “it is essential that criteria for
measuring the return on this investment be developed and . . . the basic
measures of performance for adult training programs under Title II are
the increases in employment and earnings and the reductions in welfare
dependency resulting from the participation in the program.” 
The statute clearly indicates both equity (serving the hard-to-serve)
and efficiency (maximizing the net gain) goals for the program. As we
discuss below, these goals may or may not conflict in practice. For the
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moment, take them as given and consider the question of how the fed-
eral government gets the state and local players in JTPA to further its
goals. Under JTPA, the federal money for the program was first distrib-
uted to the states by formula and then further distributed to local areas
known as “service delivery areas” (SDAs).3 The SDAs then selected
from one or more of the following options: 1) delivering services them-
selves, 2) contracting with for-profit organizations, 3) contracting with
nonprofit organizations, typically community colleges or community-
based organizations, and 4) making individual referrals to for-profit or
nonprofit organizations.
States, SDAs, and the for-profit and nonprofit service providers
under contract to the SDAs may each have goals that differ in whole or
in part from those of the federal government. States may wish to pro-
mote use of their community college systems, or economic develop-
ment in specific regions. Local governments may reduce the training
given to each participant below the optimal amount in order to provide
services to a larger number of participants (voters), or they may allo-
cate funds to activities based on popularity with voters rather than
based on the present value of the earnings gains.4 For-profit vendors
want to maximize profits, so they will follow the incentives implicit in
a performance standards system, whether or not those incentives pro-
mote program goals. Nonprofit vendors may emphasize service to par-
ticular ethnic, religious, or target groups. They may also emphasize
service to “hard to serve” clients.
The JTPA performance standards system sought, and the similar
system under WIA seeks, to provide incentives for the lower level
actors in the system to do the bidding of the federal government,
instead of pursuing their own objectives. The system did so by setting
out concrete performance measures related (it was hoped) to program
goals, and by providing budgetary rewards to SDAs based on their
measured performance.
Why Performance Systems Take the Forms They Do
A performance management system requires measures of perfor-
mance, standards that indicate acceptable performance, and rewards
and sanctions (which need not be monetary) for organizations that
exceed or fail to meet the standards. Performance-based contracting is
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a system where the vendor receives some or all of its compensation
based on achieving certain performance goals. Both approaches
attempt to align the interests of the agents with those of the principal,
and performance-based contracting may be thought of as a special case
of performance management.
Ideally, and in some cases in practice, the performance incentive
system directly measures and rewards the government’s goals. In our
context, that means measuring and rewarding earnings impacts and ser-
vice to the hard-to-serve. The latter is relatively straightforward, as it
requires only measuring the characteristics of program participants.
The former, however, is not straightforward. As is well known, mea-
suring earnings impacts is not a trivial task because of the difficulty of
estimating what labor market outcomes participants would have expe-
rienced, had they not participated.5 Social experiments, the preferred
way to estimate impacts, are expensive and time consuming, while
nonexperimental methods are controversial. Moreover, as shown in
Heckman and Smith (1999), because of “Ashenfelter’s (1978) dip,” the
observed phenomenon that the mean earnings of participants in
employment and training programs decline in the period prior to partic-
ipation, before-after estimates will not be a reliable guide to program
impacts. Instead, a comparison group of nonparticipants must be uti-
lized, an undertaking likely to greatly increase the cost of the system.
Furthermore, the real goal is long-run earnings impacts, but wait-
ing around for the long run makes little sense in administrative terms.
For administrative purposes, quick feedback is required, so that agents
perceive a clear link between their actions and the rewards and punish-
ments they receive under the incentive system (see Blalock and Bar-
now 2001). 
The difficulty in measuring program impacts, and the desire for
quick response, leaves the federal government with three alternatives
as it tries to get states and local agencies to advance its goals for the
program. First, it can use fixed-price contracts. This leaves local gov-
ernments, for-profit vendors, and nonprofit vendors to use the money
they receive to pursue their own agendas, subject to regulatory restric-
tions, such as program eligibility rules, and to professional norms. Sec-
ond, the government can use cost-based reimbursement schemes.
However, it is well documented in the health literature that such an
approach can lead to overuse of resources, which is another way of
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saying that impacts net of costs will not be maximized and, therefore,
the government’s goals will not be served. Finally, the federal govern-
ment can adopt a system of performance incentives based on short-
term outcome levels, rather than on long-term program impacts. As we
discuss in detail below, such a system provides training centers and ser-
vice providers, regardless of type, with many perverse incentives, so
that even a for-profit vendor with no agenda of its own may not end up
pursuing the government’s goals. 
Despite these potential problems, JTPA and WIA make the third
choice and reward short-term outcome levels. In the usual notation, the
JTPA and WIA systems reward based on short-term values of Y1, the
labor market outcome levels achieved by participants.6 In contrast, the
program’s goal is the maximization of long-term values of  = Y1 –Y0,
where Y0 is the counterfactual labor market outcome participants would
experience if they did not participate, and as a result,  is the impact of
participation.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Performance management in employment and training programs
began during the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act
(CETA) period in the 1970s. It was formally incorporated into JTPA in
the early 1980s. Unlike many of the performance management systems
established in the wake of the Government Performance and Results
Act of 1993 (GPRA), the JTPA system was designed primarily by
economists who wanted to maximize the employment and earnings
gains of participants. Most of the other systems devised in response to
GPRA focus on management issues rather than on program impacts. 
The JTPA program included a performance management system
that provided rankings of the local SDAs. There were about 620 SDAs
in the program, each with a geographic monopoly. Six percent of the
JTPA budget was set aside for two purposes: 1) for performance
awards to SDAs that performed well relative to performance standards
based on the labor market outcome levels (not impacts) achieved by
their participants in a given program year, and 2) for technical assis-
tance for SDAs that failed to meet their performance standards.7 
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The JTPA performance standards system evolved considerably
over its life from 1982 to 2000, when WIA replaced JTPA.8 The short
but controversial history of the JTPA performance standards system
illustrates how successive attempts to develop an effective system led
to new reforms, which in turn led to new concerns.9 
Originally, JTPA had four performance measures for Title II-A: the
entered employment rate, average wage at placement, cost per entered
employment, and the entered employment rate for welfare recipients.10
Although the statute called for measures to use gains in employment
and earnings from before the program, the U.S. Department of Labor
(USDOL) believed (incorrectly) that virtually all participants were
unemployed prior to entry, so that the postprogram outcomes would
represent before-after changes. Although the statute also called for
postprogram measures, it was widely believed that postprogram stan-
dards should only be implemented after data were collected for several
years to allow the setting of appropriate standards. 
A desire to hold local programs harmless for variations in local
economic conditions and the characteristics of their participants, com-
bined with the fact that the people responsible for developing the sys-
tem were mostly economists, led to the use of regression models to
adjust the level of satisfactory performance for differences in local con-
ditions and participant characteristics.11 To implement these models,
the system included the collection of data on participant characteristics
and local economic conditions.
Governors had a great deal of discretion in the JTPA system. They
could use the national standards without making any adjustments, they
could use the USDOL regression model for their SDAs, they could use
the regression model and make further adjustments to take account of
unique features in their states, and they could develop their own adjust-
ment procedures. Governors also could decide how to weight the vari-
ous measures and could (and did) add additional measures. They also
determined the “award function” that mapped SDA performance into
budgetary rewards. These functions varied widely among states at a
point in time and over time within states; see Courty and Marschke
(2003) for a detailed description.
When 13-week postprogram employment and earnings data
became available, four additional standards were added in program
year (PY) 1988.12 At this point, the employment and training commu-
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nity felt that there were too many performance measures, so as of PY
1990 all the measures at the time of termination were dropped and
effectively replaced by the four measures based on the 13-week follow-
up data. Another important development for PY 1990 was that the cost
standard was dropped. This was done because it was widely believed
(especially by providers of expensive long-term classroom training)
that the cost standard was leading SDAs to focus too much on “quick
fix” job search activities.13 Although most states used the USDOL
regression model to adjust the standards for local economic conditions
and the characteristics of participants, some states did not do so. To
encourage them to do so, USDOL required states not using its model to
use an alternative adjustment procedure that met criteria set out by
USDOL.
When WIA became operational in July 2000, the performance
management system was modified in several significant ways.14 Stan-
dards are now set for states as well as local areas, and the standards are
“negotiated” rather than set by a regression model.15 No automatic
adjustments are made to take account of economic conditions or partic-
ipant characteristics, but states may petition to the USDOL if circum-
stances have changed. The lack of a regression adjustment model is not
based on statutory language. Indeed, while not requiring the use of a
regression model, the statute states that the state-level standards are
supposed to be set “taking into account factors including differences in
economic conditions, the characteristics of participants when the par-
ticipants entered the program, and the services to be provided.” Like
JTPA, WIA called for the use of before–after earnings change perfor-
mance measures, although under JTPA this requirement was ignored
and the earnings performance measures were based on levels of post-
program earnings.16
There are a total of 17 core performance measures for WIA. For
adults, dislocated workers, and youth ages 19–21, the core measures
are defined as
• the entered employment rate,
• retention in employment six months after entry into employment, 
• the earnings change from the six months prior to entry to the six
months after exit, and
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• the obtained credential rate for participants who enter unsubsi-
dized employment or, in the case of older youth, enter postsec-
ondary education, advanced training, or unsubsidized
employment.
For youth between the ages of 14 and 18, the core performance mea-
sures are
• attainment of basic skills and, as appropriate, work readiness or
occupational skills,
• attainment of a high school diploma or its equivalent, and
• placement and retention in postsecondary education and training,
employment, or military service.
Finally, there are customer satisfaction measures for both participants
and employers.
The changes to the performance management system from JTPA to
WIA were significant, so we discussed the rationale for the changes
with individuals involved in the process.17 The WIA legislation did not
require dropping the model-based performance management system
used under JTPA, so the switch was based on preferences rather than
necessity.  Indeed, a workgroup of practitioners established to advise
the Employment and Training Administration (ETA) recommended
that a model-based system be retained.
There were several reasons for substituting a negotiated standards
system for a model-based system.  First, ETA wanted to signal that
WIA was going to be different from JTPA, so change was considered
good in its own right. Second, the group charged with developing the
performance management system felt that under JTPA, the system was
“looking back,” and they believed that a negotiated standards system
was prospective in nature rather than retrospective. Finally, a model-
based system, by definition, requires that data for the regression mod-
els be collected.  States indicated to ETA that they found the JTPA data
collection requirements to be onerous, and they urged that the data col-
lection be reduced under WIA.  Although this would not require aban-
donment of a model-based system, it would support such a decision. 
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EVIDENCE ON PERFORMANCE INCENTIVE EFFECTS
In this section, we examine the literature on the effects of perfor-
mance incentives on the behavior of local training centers—e.g., SDAs
in JTPA and workforce investment boards (WIBs) in WIA—that pro-
vide employment and training services to the disadvantaged. We divide
the possible effects into five categories, and then consider the evidence
from the literature on each category in turn. The five categories flow
out of (in part) the theoretical model presented in Heckman, Heinrich,
and Smith (2002).
The first type of response consists of changes in the set of persons
served. Performance incentives may induce programs to serve persons
who will increase their likelihood of doing well relative to the out-
comes measured by the incentives, rather than serving, say, the hard-to-
serve. The second type of response consists of changes in the types of
services provided conditional on who is served. Here the incentives
may lead to changes that will maximize the short-term outcomes, such
as employment at termination from the program (or shortly thereafter),
emphasized in incentive systems, rather than long-term earnings gains.
The third type of response consists of changes in the (technical) effi-
ciency of service provision conditional on who is served and what ser-
vices they receive. We have in mind here both the effect of incentives
on on-the-job leisure, as well as their effects on the effort devoted to
the design of office procedures and the like. The fourth type of
response pertains to subcontracting. Training programs may change the
set of providers they contract with, and may pass along (perhaps in
modified form) their performance incentives to their providers. The lat-
ter will, in turn, affect the actions of those providers. Finally, the fifth
type of response consists of gaming, whereby training centers take
actions to affect their measured performance that do not affect their
actual performance, other than indirect effects due to the diversion of
time and resources. 
In the remainder of this section, we summarize what is known
from the employment and training literature about each of these
responses. Much of the available evidence comes from a major experi-
mental evaluation of the JTPA program funded by USDOL and con-
ducted in the late 1980s. This evaluation, called the National JTPA
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Study, took place at a nonrandom sample of 16 JTPA SDAs around the
United States. The evaluation included both adult programs and out-of-
school youth programs. See Orr et al. (1996) for a full description of
the study as well as experimental impact estimates.
Effects of Incentives on Who Gets Served
The majority of the employment and training literature on perfor-
mance incentives addresses the question of their effects on who gets
served. Under JTPA, SDAs had strong incentives to serve persons
likely to have good labor market outcomes, regardless of whether those
outcomes were due to JTPA. Similar incentives, with a minor excep-
tion in the form of the before-after performance measure, guide the
WIA program. In fact, the absence of a regression model to adjust stan-
dards for serving individuals with labor market barriers should make
these incentives stronger under WIA than they were under JTPA. 
The literature divides this issue into two parts. First, do SDAs
(WIBs under WIA) respond to these incentives by differentially serv-
ing persons likely to have good outcomes, whether or not those good
outcomes result from the effects of the program? This is the literature
on “cream skimming.” Second, if there is cream skimming, what are its
efficiency effects? Taking the best among the eligible could be efficient
if the types of services offered by these programs have their largest net
impacts for this group. In what follows, we review the literature on
each of these two questions.
Do employment and training programs “cream skim”?
A handful of papers about the JTPA program examine whether or
not program staff cream skim in response to the incentives provided to
do so by the JTPA performance system. The key issue in this literature
is the counterfactual: to what group of nonparticipants should the par-
ticipants be compared in order to determine whether or not cream
skimming has occurred? In all cases, because the performance out-
come—some variant of Y1 in our notation—cannot be observed for the
nonparticipants, the studies proceed by comparing observable charac-
teristics correlated with Y1, such as education levels or participation in
transfer programs such as Aid to Families with Dependent Children
(AFDC) or Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF). A find-
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ing that participants have “better” characteristics in the form of higher
mean years of schooling or lower average preprogram transfer receipt
is interpreted as evidence of cream skimming.
Anderson et al. (1992) and Anderson, Burkhauser, and Raymond
(1993) compare the characteristics of JTPA enrollees in Tennessee in
1987 with the characteristics of a sample of JTPA eligibles in the same
state constructed from the Current Population Survey. The literature
suggests that less than 5 percent of the eligible population participated
in JTPA in each year (see the discussion in Heckman and Smith 1999),
which allows wide scope for cream skimming. Both papers find mod-
est evidence of cream skimming. In particular, Anderson, Burkhauser,
and Raymond’s (1993) bivariate probit analysis of program participa-
tion and postprogram job placement suggests that if eligible persons
participated at random, the placement rate would have been 61.6 per-
cent rather than 70.7 percent, a fall of 9.1 percentage points.
The problem with the Anderson et al. (1992) and Anderson,
Burkhauser, and Raymond (1993) papers is that they potentially conflate
participant self-selection with cream skimming by program officials. As
documented in Devine and Heckman (1996), the JTPA program eligi-
bility rules cast a wide net. The eligible population included both many
stably employed working poor persons and persons who were out of the
labor force. Both groups had little reason to participate in JTPA.
Heckman and Smith (2004) address the issue of self-selection ver-
sus selection by program staff using data from the Survey of Income
and Program Participation (SIPP) on JTPA eligibles combined with
data from the National JTPA Study. They break the participation pro-
cess for JTPA into a series of stages—eligibility, awareness, applica-
tion and acceptance, and participation—and look at the observed
determinants of going from each stage to the next. They find that some
differences between program eligibles and participants result primarily
from self-selection at stages of the participation process, such as
awareness, over which program staff have little or no control. For
example, for persons with fewer than 10 years of schooling, lack of
awareness plays a critical role in deterring participation, although this
group is differentially less likely to make all four transitions in the par-
ticipation process than are persons with more years of schooling. The
evidence in Heckman and Smith (forthcoming) suggests that while
cream skimming may be empirically relevant, comparing the eligible
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population as a whole to participants likely overstates its extent, and
misses a lot of substantive and policy-relevant detail.
The paper by Heckman, Smith, and Taber (1996) presents a con-
trasting view. They use data from the Corpus Christi, Texas SDA, the
only SDA in the National JTPA Study for which reliable data on all
program applicants are available for the period during the experiment.
In their empirical work, they examine whether those applicants who
reach random assignment (i.e., those who were selected to participate
in the program) differ from those who do not in terms of both predicted
outcome levels (earnings in the 18 months after random assignment)
and predicted program impacts (projected into the future and dis-
counted). Heckman, Smith, and Taber (1996) argue that it is this stage
over which program staff have the greatest control, although even here
applicants may wander off if they find employment elsewhere, get in
trouble with the law, and so on. The authors find strong evidence of
negative selection on levels combined with weak evidence for positive
selection on impacts. They attribute the former to a strong “social
worker mentality” toward helping the hard-to-serve among the eligible
that was evident in interactions with program staff at the Corpus
Christi site.
The WIA program offers an interesting contrast to JTPA because
the WIA performance standards are not adjusted by a regression model
and therefore do not hold programs harmless for the characteristics of
their participants. Because programs now have stronger incentives to
enroll individuals with few barriers to employment, we would expect
to observe enrollment shift toward this group. A recent internal
USDOL (2002) study finds that this is precisely what appears to be
occurring, at least in the area scrutinized:
A brief survey of States by our Chicago Regional Office indicated
that WIA registrations were occurring at only half the level of
enrollment achieved by JTPA. While some of this may be due to
start up issues, there are indications that the reduced registration
levels are due to a reluctance in local areas to officially register
people in WIA because of concerns about their ability to meet per-
formance goals, especially the “earnings gain” measure. It appears
that local areas in these States are selective in whom they will be
accountable for. Some local areas are basing their decisions to
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register a person on the likelihood of success, rather than on an
individual’s need for services. (p. 9)
Overall, the literature provides modest evidence that program staff
responded to the incentives provided by the JTPA performance stan-
dards system to choose participants likely to improve their measured
performance whether or not they benefited from program services. At
the same time, the evidence from the Corpus Christi SDA indicates that
staff concerns about serving the hard-to-serve could trump the perfor-
mance incentives in some contexts.18
What are the efficiency implications of cream skimming?
A number of studies have examined the efficiency implications of
cream skimming by estimating the correlation between performance
measures and program impacts. In terms of the usual notation, they
estimate the relationship between Y1, the outcome conditional on par-
ticipation, and  = Y1 – Y0, the impact of participation. If this relation-
ship is positive, so that higher outcome levels predict higher impacts,
then cream skimming is efficient because it implies serving those with
the higher impacts. In contrast, if this relationship is negative, then
cream skimming is inefficient because services are provided to those
who benefit less from them than those who would be served in the
absence of the incentive system.
Table 2.1 summarizes the evidence from the seven studies that
comprise this literature.19 The seven papers examine a variety of differ-
ent programs, ranging from the Manpower Development and Training
Act of the 1960s to the Job Corps program of today. Most rely on
experimental data for their impact estimates. With one exception, Zor-
nitsky et al. (1988), the findings are negative or mixed regarding the
relationship between outcome-based performance measures of the type
typically used in employment and training programs and program
impacts. The Zornitsky findings refer to a program, the AFDC Home-
maker Home Health Aide Demonstration, which differs from programs
such as JTPA and WIA in that it provided a homogeneous treatment to
a relatively homogeneous population. Taken together, the literature
summarized in Table 2.1 clearly indicates that, in the context of
employment and training programs, commonly used performance mea-
sures do not improve program efficiency by inducing service to those
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Study Program  Data 
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impact  Impact estimator 
Performance 
measures  Findings
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and matched (on 
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nonparticipants.
Impact on social 
security earnings 
in 1973 (from 18 










to one quarter 
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public assistance 
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programs.  The before-
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particularly weeks 
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much better than 
employment in the 
quarter after the 
program.
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labor markets. 
All measures have the 
correct sign on their 
correlation with 
earnings impacts, 
whether adjusted or not.  
The employment and 
earnings measures are 
all statistically 
significant (or close to 
it).  The welfare 
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correlated with welfare 
impacts but the 
employment measures 
are not unless adjusted.  
The measures at three 
and six months do 
better than those at 
termination, but there is 
little gain from going 
from three to six.
(continued)
36Table 2.1 (continued)
Study Program  Data 
 Measure of 
impact  Impact estimator 
Performance 
measures  Findings
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with earnings gains but 
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most programs.  
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always positively 
correlated with earnings 
impacts, but rarely 
significantly so.  It is 
not related to welfare 
savings.  Long-term 
performance measures 
do little better (and 
sometimes worse) than 
short-term measures.
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who will benefit most. Moreover, the findings indicate that cream
skimming likely has neither much of an efficiency benefit nor much of
an efficiency cost.
Effects of Incentives on Services Provided
Marschke (2002) is the only paper we know of that has examined
the effects of performance incentives on the types of services offered in
an employment and training program, holding constant the characteris-
tics of persons served. Marschke’s novel analysis uses the variation in
performance incentives facing the SDAs in the National JTPA Study to
identify the effects of performance incentives on the types of services
received by JTPA participants. This variation includes both time-series
variation within states and cross-sectional variation across states dur-
ing the period of the study. For each member of the experimental treat-
ment group, Marschke estimates a predicted outcome on each
performance measure. These are then entered into a service type choice
model along with other factors, such as predicted impacts from each
service type and measures of whether or not the participant is “hard to
serve.” Both the predicted impacts and the hard-to-serve measures are
intended to capture any caseworker efforts to act in the interest of the
participants (and the long-suffering taxpayer) or to follow their hearts
by providing the most expensive services to the worst off.
Marschke (2002) finds evidence that changes in the performance
measures employed in JTPA led SDAs to alter the mix of services pro-
vided in ways that would improve their performance relative to the
altered incentives they faced. In some cases, these changes led to
increases in efficiency, but in others they did not. Marschke (2002)
interprets his evidence as indicating that SDAs’ service choices are
responsive at the margin, but that existing performance measures do a
poor job of capturing program goals such as maximizing the (net)
impacts of the services provided.
Effects of Incentives on the Technical Efficiency 
of Service Provision
Performance incentives may affect how hard training center
employees work and how smart they work, conditional on their choices
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about whom to serve and how to serve them. Indeed, traditional incen-
tive systems in industry such as piece rates, which are intended to
increase the price of on-the-job leisure, aim to produce just such
effects.
We have not been able to locate any evidence on this type of
behavioral response in the literature on employment and training pro-
grams. This type of response is unlikely to get picked up by the sort of
regression models employed in the studies summarized in Table 2.1. To
see why, consider the following example. Suppose that establishing
performance incentives leads training program workers to work harder,
which in turn raises the expected impact of the program for every par-
ticipant by $10. In this case, the regressions described above would see
their intercepts increase by $10, but the coefficient on the performance
measures would not increase at all. 
In principle, cross-state variation in performance incentive inten-
sity, such as that employed by Cragg (1997), in combination with data
on outputs (number of persons served, etc.) and number of workers
could be used to answer this question. In the absence of such evidence,
it remains to refer to the broader economic literature on this question,
which is summarized in Prendergast (1999). He reports that this “litera-
ture points to considerable effects of compensation on performance.”
How well his conclusion generalizes to government programs where
the rewards consist of additional budgetary allocations, rather than
higher earnings for individual workers, remains an open question.
Effects of Incentives on Subcontracts and Subcontractor Behavior
In many, if not most, employment and training programs that have
operated in the United States, secondary providers operating under
subcontracts have played an important role in service delivery. In this
subsection, we consider the evidence on how performance incentives
alter the subcontracts that agencies make with their subcontractors, and
how performance-based contracts affect the performance of providers.
As elsewhere, the literature we survey draws primarily on the
experience of the JTPA program. Performance-based contracting had
an interesting history under JTPA.20 Initially, SDAs that entered into
performance-based contracts for training were able to exceed the 15
percent limit on administrative expenses in JTPA if the contract met
42 Barnow and Smith
certain provisions. By the late 1980s, a number of concerns surfaced
about the use of performance-based contracting. As enumerated in
Spaulding (2001), USDOL was concerned that states were not effec-
tively monitoring their performance-based contracts (PBCs), that total
costs billed under PBCs were not “reasonable,” that SDAs were using
PBCs for activities that contained little if any training, that contracts
did not include the performance measures required by law, that pay-
ment schedules either eliminated contractor risk or built in high profit
levels, and that profits were sometimes used to establish economic
development loan funds, which was prohibited. The Department of
Labor issued a series of guidance letters in the late 1980s intended to
reduce the use of PBCs. 
In a series of papers, Heinrich (1995, 1999, 2003) examines the
contracting behavior of a JTPA SDA in Cook County, Illinois.21 She
finds that this site passed along its performance incentives to its service
providers through performance-based contracts. These contracts often
included performance levels in excess of those facing the SDA itself,
apparently as a form of insurance. Even if some contractors failed to
meet the (inflated) standards in their contracts, most would, and so the
SDA would meet its own overall standards despite a few subcontractor
failures. Heinrich (1995, 2003) found that at this SDA, which had tech-
nical resources that most other SDAs did not, caseworkers and manag-
ers were keenly aware of how they and their subcontractors were doing
relative to their performance standards throughout the program year.
This was particularly true of the cost-per-placement standard.  Heinrich
(1999) shows that subcontractor performance in one program year rela-
tive to the cost-per-placement standards in their contract affected
whether or not they were awarded a contract in the next year.
Now consider the studies that examine the effects of performance
based contracting on subcontractor behavior. Dickinson et al. (1988)
performed some analyses looking at how the use of performance-based
contracting affected the mix of participants in JTPA. They found that,
contrary to their expectations, the use of performance-based contract-
ing was associated with a statistically significant increase in services to
minority groups, and had no effects on services to welfare recipients,
females, older workers, or individuals with other barriers to employ-
ment. Dickinson et al. (1988) also analyzed the impact of higher wage
at placement provisions on participants served, and found that they led
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to a reduction in services to welfare recipients; estimated effects on
other hard-to-serve groups were also negative but not statistically sig-
nificant.
Heinrich (2000) focuses primarily on the relationship between
organizational form (for-profit or nonprofit) and performance, but she
also explores the effects of having performance incentives in provider
contracts. She finds, for her study of an Illinois SDA, that inclusion of
performance incentives has a very strong positive effect on realized
wages and employment at termination and up to four quarters follow-
ing termination. Similarly, Spaulding (2001) analyzed the effect of per-
formance-based contracting in JTPA programs on the performance of
SDAs in program year 1998. Her results indicate that the use of perfor-
mance-based contracting is generally associated with higher outcomes. 
Overall, the literature makes two things clear. First, local training
programs sometimes pass along the performance incentives they face
to their subcontractors, perhaps with something added on as insurance.
Second, performance-based contracts yield higher performance on the
rewarded dimension. 
Strategic Responses to Performance Incentives
In addition to the substantive responses to performance incentives
considered above, in which training centers changed what they actually
did, training centers can also attempt to change their measured perfor-
mance without changing their actual performance. We refer to this as a
strategic response, or as “gaming” the performance system. Regardless
of their differing goals, all types of organizations have an incentive to
respond strategically to performance incentives, provided the cost is
low, as doing so yields additional resources to further their own goals.
The literature provides clear evidence of such gaming behavior under
JTPA.
One important form of strategic behavior under JTPA was the
manipulation of whether or not participants were formally enrolled.
Under the JTPA incentive system, only persons formally enrolled
counted towards site performance. In addition, for the first decade of
JTPA’s existence, SDAs had substantial flexibility in regard to when
someone became formally enrolled. Clever SDAs improved their per-
formance by basing enrollments on job placements rather than the initi-
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ation of services. For example, some SDAs boosted performance by
providing job search assistance without formally enrolling those
receiving it in the program. Then, if an individual found a job, the per-
son would be enrolled, counted as a placement, and terminated, all in
quick succession. Similarly, SDAs would send potential trainees to
employers to see if the employer would approve them for an on-the-job
training slot; enrollment would not take place until a willing employer
was found.
There are two pieces of evidence regarding the empirical impor-
tance of this phenomenon. The first is indirect, and consists of the fact
that USDOL found it enough of a problem to change the regulations.
Specifically, in 1992 USDOL required that individuals become
enrolled once they received objective assessment and that they count as
a participant for performance standards purposes once they received
any substantive service, including job search assistance.22 
The other evidence comes from the National JTPA Study. As part
of their process analysis of the treatments provided at the 16 SDAs in
the study, Kemple, Doolittle, and Wallace (1993) conducted interviews
of nonenrolled members of the experimental treatment group at 12 of
the 16 sites. These results, reported in their Table 3.2, show that 53 per-
cent of nonenrolled treatment group members received services, most
often referrals to employers for possible on-the-job training (36 percent
of all nonenrollees) and job search assistance (20 percent of all nonen-
rollees). They report that “. . . most of the study sites enrolled individu-
als in classroom training when they attended their first class or in OJT
when they worked their first day . . .”
The flexibility of JTPA also allowed strategic manipulation of the
termination decision. Because performance standards in JTPA were
based on terminees, SDAs had no incentive to terminate individuals
from the program that were not successfully placed in a job. By keep-
ing them on the rolls, the person’s lack of success would never be rec-
ognized and used against the SDA in measuring its performance. As
USDOL explains in one of its guidance letters, “Without some policy
on termination, performance standards create strong incentives for
local programs to avoid terminating failures even when individuals no
longer have any contact with the program.”23
 Problems with local programs retaining participants on the rolls
long after they stopped receiving services go back to the days of JTPA’s
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predecessor, the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act
(CETA). In one of their guidance letters, USDOL observed that “moni-
tors and auditors found that some participants continued to be carried
in an ‘active’ or ‘inactive’ status for two or three years after last contact
with these programs.”24 For Title II-A of JTPA, USDOL limited the
period of inactivity to 90 days, although some commentators suggested
periods of 180 days or more.
Courty and Marschke (1996, 1997, 2004) provide additional evi-
dence on the strategic manipulation of termination dates using data
from the National JTPA Study. The first type of evidence consists of
the timing of termination relative to the end of services as a function of
the employment status of the trainee as of the end of services. Assum-
ing that the timing of termination responds mainly to the employment
at termination standard in place during the time their data were col-
lected (rather than the wage rate or cost standards, which would be
more difficult to game), they argue that sites should immediately termi-
nate participants who are employed when their services end. In con-
trast, they should not terminate participants who are not employed at
the end of their services; instead, they should wait and see if they later
become employed, at which point they should then terminate them
from the program. Not surprisingly, Courty and Marschke (1996, 1997,
2004) find that the sites in the National JTPA Study did exactly this
with, for example, Courty and Marschke (1997, Figure 1), revealing a
spike in terminations at the end of services for employed participants,
and a spike in terminations at the end of the mandatory 90 days after
the end of services for participants not employed at the end of services.
Their analysis likely understates the full extent of sites’ strategic
behavior, as it takes the date of the end of services as given, when in
fact sites had some control over this as well. For example, a participant
without a job at the end of classroom training could be assigned to a
job club in the hopes that employment would soon follow.
Courty and Marschke (1997) interviewed 11 of the 16 sites in the
National JTPA Study regarding their responses to the switch from mea-
suring employment at termination to measuring it 90 days after termi-
nation. They report that 
[m]ost administrators indicated that . . . case managers began
tracking terminees until the follow-up period expired. To
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increase the chances that an employment match lasted until the
third month, some SDAs reported that they offered special ser-
vices between termination and follow-up, such as child-care,
transportation and clothing allowances. Case managers also
attempted to influence employers to keep their clients until the
third month. (p. 387)
Moreover, “training administrators reported that after the third month,
they did not contact the client again.” While these follow-up services
may add value, their sudden termination at 90 days, and their sudden
use after the change in performance standards, suggests motives other
than impact maximization.
The second type of evidence from the National JTPA Study
reported in Courty and Marschke (1996, 1997, 2004) concerns the tim-
ing of terminations relative to the end of the program year. In JTPA,
performance was measured over the program year from July 1 to June
30. For SDAs in states where there were no marginal rewards for per-
formance above the standard, this leads to an incentive to wait on ter-
mination until the end of the program year when possible, and then to
strategically terminate each participant in the program year in which
his or her marginal value is highest. Consider a site that comes into
June well above its performance standard. It should then terminate
nonemployed participants who have finished their services until its
measured performance is just above the standard. It thereby gets its
reward in the current year, while starting the next year with as small a
stock of poorly performing enrollees as possible.
Courty and Marschke (2004) builds on the analyses of Courty and
Marschke (1996, 1997) by embedding them in an econometric frame-
work, and by examining whether the manipulation of the termination
dates is merely an accounting phenomenon or whether it has efficiency
costs. To do this, they look at nonexperimental differences in mean
impacts between persons terminated at training centers that appear to
engage in more gaming (based on measures of the average waiting
time to termination after the conclusion of training), at differences in
mean impacts for trainees terminated in June (at the end of the program
year) relative to other trainees, and at whether or not trainees are more
likely to have their training truncated at the end of the program year.
The impacts at the end of the training year are also interacted with how
close the center is to its performance standards for the year. All of their
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analyses indicate an apparent (and surprisingly large) efficiency cost to
the gaming behavior. 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The literature on the behavioral effects of performance manage-
ment systems in employment and training programs is a small one.
From it, we draw the following conclusions. First, there is modest evi-
dence of cream skimming in JTPA, which had such a system. Because
the performance management system in WIA does not adjust the stan-
dards for sites that serve more disadvantaged groups, WIA provides
even stronger incentives to cream skim than did JTPA. There is no evi-
dence, however, that cream skimming behavior would not have
occurred even in the absence of the federal performance standards sys-
tem, perhaps in response to local political incentives. Second, there is
fairly strong evidence in the literature that the performance measures
typically used in these systems, which focus on short-term outcome
levels of participants, have little or no relationship to long-run impacts
on employment or earnings. As such, to the extent that program admin-
istrators devote time and effort to including persons in the program
who will do well on the performance measures, they are not promoting
efficiency. Third, there is not much empirical evidence about the effect
of performance standards systems on the types of services provided.
The single paper that exists suggests that SDAs under JTPA allocated
services to increase their measured performance; effects on efficiency
are mixed. 
Fourth, there is essentially no evidence on the important question
of the effects of performance management on the technical efficiency
of service delivery. Fifth, performance management at the level of the
SDA or WIB leads to changes in the relationship between the two and
their subcontractors in some instances. The nature of the contracts
changes as local programs seek to insure their aggregate (across con-
tractors) performance, and contractors respond by changing their own
behavior to please the local program. Sixth, and finally, there is strong
evidence that local programs devote time and resources to gaming per-
formance management systems by increasing their measured perfor-
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mance in ways that do not affect their actual performance. These
strategic responses represent a cost of having a performance manage-
ment system.
In light of these findings, we make two main recommendations.
The first is that USDOL commission additional research on the effec-
tiveness of and incentive structure created by performance manage-
ment systems and that it devote resources to providing the data
necessary to support such research. USDOL has spent large sums eval-
uating its employment and training programs, but much less on evalu-
ating its performance management systems. It is clear to us that
marginal returns have not been equated on these two lines of research.
Several types of research would serve to improve our understand-
ing and use of performance management systems. These include, but
are not limited to, the following:
• The search should continue for short-term outcome measures that
are reliably correlated with long-run program impacts and cannot
be gamed by local programs. 
• Additional research on the effects of performance management
on the types of services offered, on the match between participant
characteristics and service type, and on the technical efficiency of
service provision would provide a fuller understanding of what
the current types of standards actually do. 
• Research on the effects of other types of performance measures
sometimes adopted at the state level, such as measures designed
to encourage service to particular subgroups among the eligible,
would inform decisions about whether or not to introduce such
measures at the national level. 
• Finally, research on the response of WIBs to alternative reward
functions at the state level would provide useful information
about how to design such functions in the future. Key aspects
here include the extent of competition among WIBs, as in tourna-
ment systems, variation in the number of standards a WIB must
pass to receive any budgetary reward, and the effects of marginal
incentives for performance above the standard.
The data required to support the proposed research effort include a
panel data set, with the WIB as the unit of observation, containing for
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each program year the negotiated standards for each WIB, the actual
performance of the WIB, characteristics of the economic environment
and eligible and participant populations for the WIB, and the details of
the relevant state policies, including any additional standards and
related outcomes, and the reward function linking WIB outcomes to
budgetary rewards. Had such data been collected under JTPA, the
knowledge base for redesigning the WIA system would be much more
solid. Even the limited information for the National JTPA Study exper-
imental sites described in Courty and Marschke (2003) yielded useful
insights. These data should be collected, maintained, and distributed to
the research community, presumably by a private research firm under
contract to USDOL.
Our second recommendation is that USDOL take advantage of the
WIA reauthorization process to redesign the WIA performance man-
agement system to reflect the current base of evidence on the perfor-
mance of these systems. As we show in this paper, the systemic
changes from the JTPA performance management system to the WIA
system ignored the literature and, overall, took the system farther away
from the evidence than it was before. In the absence of a redesign along
the lines suggested here, we view the present system as a step back-
ward that should either be scrapped or have its effects reduced by limit-
ing the amount of incentive payments based upon it, pending further
research.
We envision four possible scenarios for such a redesign effort,
which we list in order of what we see as their desirability. The first
redesign scenario represents adoption of an “ideal” performance sys-
tem. In an ideal system, randomization would be directly incorporated
in the normal operations of the WIA program. Such randomization
need not exclude persons from any services, but only assign a modest
fraction to low-intensity services, e.g., the core services under WIA. It
could be incorporated directly into a system similar in spirit to the
Frontline Decision Support System (if that system is used to assign
individuals to services) and so made invisible to line workers Eberts
and O’Leary 2002). The randomization would then be used, in con-
junction with outcome data already collected, to produce experimental
impact estimates that would serve as the performance measures. For
sample size reasons, randomization might be viable in practice only for
state-level performance incentives or only when applied to perfor-
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mance measures consisting of moving averages over several program
years.
The second reform scenario takes a different direction. It acknowl-
edges that short-term outcome levels have little or no correlation with
program impacts and so changes the system to focus on the program’s
goals other than efficiency. Such a system could focus, for example, on
measures related to who gets served and measures of customer (partic-
ipants and employers) satisfaction. The customer satisfaction measures
would focus on aspects of the program such as waiting times and cour-
tesy of staff, about which the customer is the best judge, and not on
value-added, of which the customer is likely to be a poor evaluator (as
shown empirically for JTPA in Heckman and Smith, 1998). Somewhat
surprisingly, the present system does not do a very good job of guiding
behavior along these dimensions, though it easily could. The timeliness
standards employed in the Unemployment Insurance system provide
an example of a successful system along these lines (see the discussion
in West and Hildebrand 1997).
The third reform scenario downplays or scraps the current system
until additional research identifies measures based on short-term out-
comes that correlate with long-term program impacts, or provides con-
vincing evidence that the current system has beneficial effects on
dimensions, such as the efficiency of time use by program staff, for
which little or no evidence presently exists. In this scenario, the negoti-
ated performance standards could be taken over at the national level
and used in a systematic manner to generate knowledge about WIB
responses to particular performance measures and to the general tough-
ness of the standards.
The fourth and final reform scenario simply modifies the WIA sys-
tem to look more like the JTPA system. In practice, this scenario might
represent a baseline to which elements of the other scenarios could be
added. The heart of this scenario consists of replacing the negotiated
standards with a model-based system similar to that in JTPA. Within
the context of such a model-based system, a number of suggestions for
marginal changes become relevant. First, the model should not be rees-
timated every year using a single year’s data. Doing so caused a lot of
volatility in the standards, and in the effects of particular variables, but
did not produce any corresponding benefit. Barnow (1996) discusses
how this variability applied to persons with disabilities.  Second, given
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the current focus on return on investment within WIA, a cost standard
might be reintroduced, designed in a way to get around problems with
WIBs that mix funds from a variety of sources, but that encourages
local programs to focus more on the return on investment. Third, the
literature surveyed here has some lessons for the optimal length of the
follow-up period for the outcome-based performance measures. In par-
ticular, the literature suggests that longer is not always better in terms
of correlation with program impacts, above and beyond the problem
that longer follow-up periods interfere with the system’s ability to pro-
vide reasonably quick feedback. 
Notes
We thank Richard West and participants at the “Job Training and Labor Exchange”
conference in September 2002 for helpful comments.
1. See D’Amico et al. (2002) and D’Amico (2002) for more information on the
implementation of WIA and its relationship to JTPA.
2. A principal–agent problem is not a necessary condition for a performance man-
agement system. An individual or firm might adopt such a system as a way of
quantifying and rewarding progress toward distant or difficult to measure goals.
3. In some instances, the state government assumed responsibility for some or all of
the service delivery in the state.
4. See Barnow (1979) for illustrative models of this type of behavior.
5. See, for example, the discussion in Heckman, LaLonde, and Smith (1999).
6. WIA also includes measures of the change in earnings from the pretraining period
to the posttraining period.
7. See Blalock and Barnow (2001) and Barnow (2000) for discussions about the ori-
gins of the performance management system in JTPA.
8. WIA became law in 1998 but was not implemented until 2000.
9. We have more to say about this back-and-forth pattern in a later section.
10. For a description of the performance management system in the early days of
JTPA, see Barnow and Constantine (1988).
11. It might make more sense to hold constant the characteristics of the eligible popu-
lation, which the sites do not choose, rather than of program participants, which
they do.
12. JTPA operated on a program year rather than a fiscal year basis. PY1990 began
July 1, 1990, and ran through June 30, 1991.
13. See the discussion in Dickinson et al. (1988).
14. See Section 136 of the WIA statute for a description of the law’s performance
management requirements.
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15. States we have spoken with indicated that the negotiations are largely one sided,
with USDOL establishing the standards.
16. See USDOL (2000a,b) for more details on the WIA performance standards sys-
tem.
17. Our discussion of the motivation for the WIA changes draws on discussions with
several staff who participated in the development of the WIA performance man-
agement system. As some of our informants requested anonymity, we simply
thank all of them for sharing their views without mentioning their names.
18. This is consistent with the findings from the earlier study by Dickinson et al.
(1988).
19. This table is a modified version of Table 3 in Heckman, Heinrich, and Smith
(2002). See that paper for a more detailed survey of these results.
20. This section is based on Spaulding (2001).
21. This section draws on Heckman, Heinrich, and Smith (2002).
22. See Training and Employment Notice (TEIN) 31-92 for the formal description of
requirements on when a person must be enrolled in the program. http://
wdr.doleta.gov/directives/corr_doc.asp?DOCN=299.
23. See TEIN 5-93. http://wdr.doleta.gov/directives/corr_doc.asp?DOCN=770.
24. See TEIN 3-92. http://wdr.doleta.gov/directives/corr_doc.asp?DOCN=282.
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